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Selected Close Corporation Problems
I
CHOOSING BETWEEN STOCK OPTIONS AND OUTRIGHT SALES
Warren E. Hacker
THE PROBLEM
Stock ownership in the employer corporation by its executives is gen-
erally recognized as a desirable business objective.1 In part, this derives
from the belief that an executive who owns shares in his employer com-
pany has a greater feeling of belonging and that he is working for him-
self and his family in contributing to the success of the corporation. Stock
ownership permits him to share in the company's growth in a direct tan-
gible way: he or his estate eventually realizes on that share without in-
come tax or at capital gains rates rather than at the steeply graduated
rates applicable to ordinary compensation.
These factors are especially important in a dose corporation. Because
it generally has fewer key people, the outlook and attitude of each one of
them is relatively more important to the enterprise than that of his coun-
terpart in a large publicly held corporation, and his relative contribution
to the success of the venture is greater and more dearly identifiable in
a close corporation. Moreover, except by offering a proprietary interest,
the small close corporation rarely can approach either the security or the
opportunity which the large corporation can offer to management. There-
fore, arranging for stock purchases by key people is more important in
the close corporation to attract and keep able management. Yet both
the non-tax and tax problems of doing so are immensely more difficult
for the close corporation than for the publicly-held company.
Non-Tax Elements of the Problem
Frequently, the key man lacks substantial capital to invest in stock of
his employer corporation. If he has capital available, he generally is re-
luctant to commit all or a substantial part of it to purchasing stock. He
may be willing to risk his time and effort on the close corporation's suc-
cess. Sometimes he may be willing to commit his future earnings. But,
of course, he prefers that the stock purchase arrangement be on a no-risk
or limited-risk basis to the extent this is possible. Thus, the employee
will prefer a stock option where he can wait and see before committing
1. See generally WASHNGTON & ROTHSCsHmI, COMPENSATnG Tm CoRpORATE ExEcu-
TmVE 121 (Rev. ed. 1961).
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capital, rather than a stock purchase plan where he commits capital from
the outset. Sometimes he will demand that the company or its other
shareholders be obligated to repurchase his stock should he die or leave
the employ of the company, voluntarily or involuntarily, with or without
cause. On the other hand, the corporation's desire is generally to have
the key man and his capital as completely committed as possible. If the
executive has a substantial part of his estate at risk in the venture, he has
an additional motive to perform to his utmost and is less likely to leave
the company's employ voluntarily. From the corporation's viewpoint,
the stock purchase arrangement has less incentive value if it is on a no-
risk or limited-risk basis to the employee.
It is hard enough to find a mutually satisfactory basis for reconciling
these points of view when the corporation is publicly-held and its stock
readily salable. It is even harder where the corporation is closely held.
Generally, the dividend yield on a close corporation's shares is small be-
cause it is growing and needs to retain its earnings. Sale transactions in
its shares are infrequent. The market is generally limited to the com-
pany itself and to other shareholders. Indeed, in many instances, there
will be legal restrictions in the articles of incorporation or by contract
among the shareholders limiting transfer to persons within that group.
As a consequence, the fair market value of close corporation shares is a
matter of judgment as to which opinions may vary widely.
Basic Tax Elements of the Problem
Difficulty in determining fair market value is by far and away the
principal problem from the tax viewpoint in arranging for employee pur-
chase of close corporation stock. Transfer by the corporation of its shares
to the employee for cash, for services, or both does not result in income
to it.2 The problems which arise are the amount of and time when
income if any is realized by the purchasing employee and the correlative
questions as to the deduction allowable to the corporation. All of these
depend in the first instance on whether the corporation sells shares to
the employee at less than their fair market value, and, if so, the extent of
the bargain.
Thus, the basic income tax problem in employee stock purchases is
whether and the extent to which the employee purchases the stock at a
2. Unless otherwise noted, all CODE § references herein are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, as amended by the Revenue Act of 1964 (Pub. L. No. 88-272, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(Feb. 26, 1964)) and all Reg. § references are to the Income Tax Regulations (1957), as
amended to date. CODE § 1032 (a) provides that no gain is recognized to a corporation on
the receipt of money for its stock (including treasury stock). Reg. § 1.1932-1 (a) provides
that a transfer by a corporation of its stock as compensation for services is considered for this
purpose as a disposition of such stock for money.
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bargain price. The Income Tax Regulations have since 1923' provided
that if an employer transfers any property to an employee for an amount
less than its fair market value at the time of transfer, the employee real-
izes compensation in the amount of the bargain at that time.4 The pres-
ent Regulations contain one important and quite new exception to this
rule, viz., if the property transferred is "subject to a restriction which has
a significant effect on its value," then the time the compensation is real-
ized is postponed until the restriction lapses, and the amount of the bar-
gain purchase is then determined.5 This exception is discussed in some
detail below. However, it is important here to observe that it applies to
any bargain sale to an employee.
In typical fashion, the Regulations are not nearly so explicit as to the
corporation's deduction. However, it seems dear that if the employee
realizes income under the bargain purchase rule, the corporation has a
deduction in the same amount and at the same time,6 subject, of course,
to the usual limitations that the compensation be reasonable in amount,
and the like.
The problem of ascertaining fair market value of the stock is present
whether the stock is sold to the employee outright or is sold to him pur-
suant to his exercise of an option granted to him, and, in the latter event,
whether the option is a "qualified stock option ' 7 or a "non-qualified stock
3. Regulations 62, Article 31, promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1921 (T.D. 3435,
approved Feb. 7, 1923).
4. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (2) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6416, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 126
provides this generally: "Except as otherwise provided in [CoDE] section 421 and the regula-
tions thereunder .. " Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (4) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6416, 1959-2 Cum.
BULL. 126 deals specifically with transfer by a corporation of its own stock as compensation.
The attempted distinction between "compensatory" and "proprietary" options is no longer
possible. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956); Commissioner v. Smith 324 U.S.
177 (1945).
5. Reg. § 1.61-2 (d) (5) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6416, 1959-2 Cutm. BULL. 126, makes
the rules of Reg. § 1.421-6 (1959), as amended, T.D. 6481, 1960-2 CUM. BULL. 159, appli-
cable in determining the time and amount of compensation to be included in the employee's
income "notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph. . ." of the Regulations dealing
with bargain purchases generally.
6. See Reg. § 1.162-9 (1958) as to deductibility of bonuses to employees paid in kind
rather than cash. See also Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (6) (f) (1959), as amended, T.D. 6481,
1960-2 CuM. BULL. 159, that the employer "is considered to have paid compensation... at
the same time and in the same amount" as the employer is considered to have realized com-
pensation where the bargain purchase is pursuant to a non-qualified stock option. (Empha-
sis supplied.) It is believed that an accrual method employer will be entitled to the deduc-
tion in that year notwithstanding the reference to "paid" in the Regulation. It is also be-
lieved that the same rule will be applied for any bargain sale to an employee and not limited
to those made pursuant to a non-qualified stock option. Note, however, that Reg. § 1.61-
2(d) (5) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6416, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 126, in terms relates only
to the employee's income and does not incorporate the rules of Reg. § 1.421-6 as to time and
amount of the employer's deduction.
7. As defined by CODE § 422(b). CODE § 423 provides for stock options granted under
employee stock purchase plans which meet very strict requirements. CODE § 424, with minor
exceptions, deals with restricted stock options granted before January 1964 and, therefore, is
not a planning tool. "Non-qualified stock option" refers to any other employee stock option.
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
option." In the case of close corporation stock, it is impossible to know
the fair market value until the Internal Revenue Service or a court has
acted. Accordingly, this problem persists so long as the statute of limi-
tations is open for the year or years when the bargain purchase occurs.
The Service is, of course, at liberty to second-guess the value of the stock
with the benefit of hindsight. The question here considered is whether
and how this risk can be avoided or reduced while still satisfying the non-
tax elements of the problem.
Basically, there are two methods by which the close corporation may
sell shares of its stock to employees: first, pursuant to a stock option and,
secondly, by a sale and transfer without intervention of an option. We
shall consider these alternative routes in that order.
STOCK OPTIONS
The principal difference between this route and an outright sale of
the stock to the employee is that it gives the employee some time before
he is required to commit his capital. It permits him to accumulate some
capital during that period, e.g., from salary and bonus. But more im-
portantly, the employee is not committed to buy during the option period
even though the corporation is committed to sell. This gives the em-
ployee the opportunity to decide whether to invest. If the value of the
stock goes up he can exercise the option and obtain a bargain purchase.
If it goes down, he can allow the option to lapse and keep his capital, this
even though the failure of the business to prosper and grow may be di-
rectly due to his own mismanagement. This limited-risk arrangement is
fine for the executive but, as stated above, does not entirely suit the in-
terests of the corporation. It is not unusual for the option to be exer-
cisable in installments over a period of years, sometimes with a provision
for lapse of the option as to any annual installment not then purchased.
Qualified Stock Options
The stock option may be either a "qualified stock option" under the
statute8 or a "non-qualified stock option." The principal difference in
the income tax treatment of the two is that, properly handled, the quali-
fied stock option permits avoidance of the bargain purchase rule upon
acquisition of the stock for less than its then fair market value at the time
of exercise. Making the employee option a "qualified stock option" is a
relatively simple drafting matter for an informed lawyer' where the stock
is quoted on a stock exchange or its fair market value can otherwise be
8. Ibid.
9. See Bergen, Restricted Stock Options for Executives of Closely Held Corporations, N.Y.U.
11TH INST. ON FED. TAx 145 (1953); Vesely, Compensation Arrangements in Smaller
Corporations: Compensation Through Use of Corporation Stock, 29 U. CINc. L. REV. 52
(1960). The more stringent requirements of CODE § 422 pose no more difficult problems
for the draftsman than did those of CODE § 421 prior to the Revenue Act of 1964.
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ascertained with reasonable certainty.' ° However, a prime require-
ment is that the option price be not less than the fair market value of
the stock at the time the option is granted.' Where the fair market
value of the stock cannot be ascertained with reasonable certainty, there
can be no certainty that the option will be a "qualified stock option."
That uncertainty persists until the stock acquired pursuant to the re-
stricted stock option has been disposed of. The statute provides that if
the employee does not dispose of the stock within three years and one day
from the date the stock was acquired, then his entire gain on disposition
is taxed at capital gain rates. 2 In no event will the corporation have a
deduction"3 unless the employee disposes of his stock within that period.
In that event, the employee realizes ordinary income and the corporation
is entitled to claim a deduction in the year the disqualifying disposition oc-
curred. 4 Generally, the amount of both the employee's income and the
corporation's deduction is the excess of fair market value of the stock
over the option price at the time the option was exercised.'" Thus, the
question of fair market value is important not only to assure that the
option is a "qualified stock option;" it is also important when the em-
ployee disposes of the stock acquired by him pursuant to exercise of the
option.
The importance of ascertaining fair market value and the inherent
difficulty of doing so present a real challenge to the ingenuity of lawyers
advising dose corporations. An advance ruling on value is not possible
because the Internal Revenue Service refuses to rule in advance on factual
matters generally. 6 One possibility would be to specify a price in the
option but include an escalator clause, i.e., that should the Internal Reve-
nue Service or a court later determine that the specified option price was
less than the fair market value of the shares at the time of grant, the
option price should be appropriately increased. This would have com-
pletely solved the problem. However, the Service has ruled that inclu-
sion of any such provision disqualifies the option. 7
10. Reg. § 1.421-2 (a) (5) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6527, 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 153, pro-
vides: "Any reasonable valuation methods may be used" to determine whether the option price
is at least 85% of fair market value in determining whether the option is a "restricted stock
option" and refers to the methods described in Estate Tax Reg. § 20.2031-2. It may be as-
sumed that the same principles will be applied under CODE § 422 to determine whether an
option is a "qualified stock option."
11. CODE § 422(b) (4).
12. CODE §§ 422(a) (1), 421(a) (1).
13. CoDE 5§ 422(a) (1), 421(a) (2).
14. CODE § 421(b).
15. Ibid. But see CODE §§ 422(c) (4), (5) for exceptions where the amount realized
on such dispositions is less than the value of the stock at exercise and where the disposition
is by or for the benefit of an insolvent individual.
16. Rev. Proc. 62-32, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 527.
17. Rev. Rul. 59-243, 1959-2 CuM. BuLL 123. Reg. § 1A21-1(d) (2) (i) (a) (1957), as
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Another possibility is to impose such restrictions on the transfer and
sale of the shares acquired upon exercise of the option as will fix the
fair market value of the stock. This possible solution, the only one re-
maining in the present posture of the authorities, is discussed in detail
below. But even this solution still leaves much room for expensive,
time-consuming dispute and litigation with the Service as to whether the
restrictions imposed on the shares had the desired effect. And if the
option is exercised in installments, the possibility of dispute arises each
time some stock is purchased.
Non-Qualified Stock Options
There is no statute governing non-qualified stock options. The prin-
cipal authority at the present time are Regulations adopted in 1961."s
These Regulations go beyond the decided cases and, indeed, in some re-
spects appear to be contrary to them.'" For present purposes, it is suffi-
cient to note that a question exists as to whether the Regulations are valid.
Under these Regulations, the time when the employee realizes income
and the corporation has a deduction, as well as the amount of such in-
come and deduction, depends in the first instance upon whether the non-
qualified stock option has a "readily ascertainable" fair market value. If
it does, both the employee's income and the corporation's deduction occur
at the date when the option is granted, not when it is exercised." The
amount in both instances is the excess of the fair market value of the
option at that time and the amount, if any, paid for it.2 '
Under the Regulations, the option will have a "readily ascertainable'"
fair market value if such options are traded on an established market,
otherwise only if certain stringent requirements are met.22 Even options
amended, T.D. 6527, 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 153 provides: "The option price must be fixed or
determinable at the time the option is granted." (Emphasis supplied.) Again, it may be
assumed that the same principles will be applied under CODE § 422.
18. Reg § 1.421-6, (1959), as amended, T.D. 6481, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 159.
19. Hawkins, Employer Stock Options, 100 TRUSTS & ESTATES 516 (1961); LeFevre, Non-
Restricted Stock Options, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAX 353 (1962); Zarkey, The Tax.
Incidents of Non-Restricted Stock Options, U. SO. CAL. 1962 TAX INST.; Alfred, Fair Market
Value Concept: Current Problem Areas in Income Taxation, 14 W. RES. L. REV. 217, 225
(1963). The Regulations have been criticized in Colton v. Williams, 209 F. Supp. 381 (N.D.
Ohio 1962).
20. Reg. § 1.421-6(a) (3), (c) (1), (f) (1959), as amended, T.D. 6481, 1960-2 CuM.
BULL. 159. The possibility that the option itself may have value and represent compensation
when granted rather than or in addition to the bargain purchase when exercised was recog-
nized by dictum in Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 249 (1956); Commissioner v.
Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 181 (1945).
21. Reg. S 1.421-6(a) (3), (c) (1), (f).
22. This will occur only (a) if the option is freely transferable, (b) if it is exercisable im-
mediately in full, (c) if neither the option nor the optioned property are subject to restrictions
or conditions which have "a significant effect" on fair market value, and (d) if the fair mar-
ket value of the "option privilege" is readily ascertainable. Reg. § 1.4 21-6(c) (3).
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of publicly held corporations will rarely qualify if these Regulations are
valid. The possibility that an option on close corporation stock may have
a "readily ascertainable" fair market value under these tests is so slight as
to be completely disregarded. 23 Accordingly, the employee's income and
the corporation's deduction do not occur at the time the option is granted.
Both are deferred until the time the option is exercised, or still later than
that. Ordinarily, the option will not be exercised unless the value of the
stock increases after the date that the option is granted. This means that
the amount of income to be realized by the employee and the amount of
the corporation's correlative deduction will be greater than if it were de-
termined as of the date the option was granted.
Under the Regulations, 4 where the option does not have a "readily
ascertainable" fair market value, the employee's income and the corpora-
tion's deduction may occur and be measured as of the date the option is
exercised or a still later date, with the possibility of a still greater amount
of income to the employee and correlative corporate deduction. If the
stock is not subject to restrictions when transferred or, in any event, not
subject to restrictions which "significantly affect" its value, the employee
realizes income and the corporation is entitled to a deduction at the time
the option is exercised, sold, or exchanged. In that case, the amount of
the income and deduction is the excess of the amount realized over the
option price. However, where stock acquired pursuant to exercise of an
option is subject to a restriction which "significantly affects" its value,
then the employee realizes income and the corporation becomes entitled
to a deduction on the date the restriction lapses or the stock is sold or ex-
changed. 5 In the latter case, the amount of both the employee's income
and the corporation's deduction is the lesser of (a) the excess of value of
the stock at that time (or the amount realized) over the price paid, or
(b) the excess of the non-restricted value of the stock over the option
price at the time the option was exercised.26
Thus, the fair market value question is essentially the same whether
a qualified or a non-qualified stock option is used. In both cases, it arises
in the year the option is exercised if the stock acquired is not subject to a
restriction which significantly affects its value. In both cases, it arises
each time some of the stock is purchased if the option is exercised in in-
stallments. However, again assuming that there is no restriction which
23. But see Colton v. Williams, 209 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ohio 1962), where the court
twisted the Regulations to avoid holding them invalid.
24. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (1) (1959), as amended, T.D. 6481, 1960-2 CuM. BULL 159.
25. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (2) (i) (1959), as amended, T.D. 6481, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 159.
This is contrary to Robert H. Lehman, 17 T.C. 652 (1951), gov't appeal dismissed, Second
Circuit. June 8, 1952; acq., 1951-1 CuM. BULL. 3; acq. withdrawn and -non-acq., 1962-2
CuM. BULL. 7. See Kempler, Non-Restricted Stock Option Plans - Kuchman and Lehman
Cases, 16 TAx L. REv. 339 (1961).
26. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) , 2) (i) (1959), as amended, T.D. 6481, 1960-2 CUM. BULL. 159.
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significantly affects the stock's value, at least this important difference
between the two exists:"' where a non-qualified stock option is used, it
is only for the year or years of exercise that the fair market value question
can be raised. Once these years are barred under the statute of limita-
tions, the question is no longer an issue and the employee is assured of
favorable capital gains treatment upon later sale.28
OUTRIGHT PURCHASE
The risk of dispute over fair market value is still less where the stock
is transferred to the employee without the intervention of an option. And
outright sale can accomplish substantially everything which the option
arrangement accomplishes with one notable exception. For example, sup-
pose the employee is permitted to subscribe for authorized but unissued
shares of an Ohio corporation, obligating himself to pay the subscription
price in installments (say, equal amounts over five years) with interest
at a fair rate and the right to prepay the balance without penalty. The
corporate legislation and form of subscription agreement provide that as
each installment is paid, a certificate for the appropriate number of shares
will be issued.2" Under this arrangement, the employee becomes a share-
holder of the corporation immediately"0 with all of the rights of a share-
holder, with the exception that he will be entitled to vote the shares rep-
27. There is possibly a further advantage to using a non-qualified rather than a qualified
stock option, viz., use of an escalator clause to minimize the risk of dispute as to fair market
value. If, for example, the option price is specified at the figure the parties believe to be the
fair market value with a proviso that should the Commissioner determine a higher value, the
employee is obligated to pay the difference, there would never be a bargain purchase and,
hence, never any income if it were effective. The escalator clause, if effective, would elim-
inate any motive for the Service to raise the fair market value issue. While the Service takes
the position that this disqualifies an option under the Regulations on restricted or qualified
stock options (see note 17 supra), this Regulation does not apply to non-qualified stock op-
tions. Rev. Rul. 59-243, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 123, asserts as additional support for this
position that "the parties to an option contract are not competent to confer upon [the Commis-
sioner] any function of making such value determinations or to subject him to any duty to
make them," citing Frederic W. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 327 U.S.
785 (1944). That case holds void as against public policy a condition on a gift that if it
were held subject to gift tax, it should be deemed not included in the conveyance. It is i.ot
at all clear that Procter would apply to an escalator provision in a qualified stock option, pat
ticularly if it were made to depend upon a determination by the Service rather than by the
courts. There would then not be the "trifling with the judicial process" which Procter con-
demns. However, it seems probable that the Service would dispute the effectiveness of such
an escalator provision in light of Rev. Rul. 59-243, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 123. Furthermore,
the employee might well prefer to take his chances on the dispute with the Service, rather than
undertake this sort of obligation. It costs more to pay the excess to the company than to pay
income on the excess.
28. Stock acquired pursuant to a non-qualified stock option can be disposed of after the
usual six month holding period with capital gain consequences even though within three
years after the stock was acquired.
29. OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.24(B) prohibits issuance of the certificate until the subscrip-
tion for the shares represented by it has been paid.
30. OHIo REV. CODE § 1701.03(E).
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resented by the unpaid portion of his subscription only so long as his sub-
scription is not in default.3 If the interest rate charged does not exceed
the rate of dividends paid on the shares while the subscription is outstand-
ing, this arrangement accomplishes generally what a stock option exer-
cisable in installments would accomplish, except that the employee is
committed from the outset to make the purchase and is personally liable
for the subscription price. This is not the limited-risk arrangement which
the employee usually would prefer. Accordingly, the option route must
be used in some cases. However, in other situations, the employee may
not be so insistent on an option, particularly if he understands the recur-
rent risks inherent in the fair market value problem and the possibility
of reducing those risks if the outright purchase route is followed.
Of course, outright purchase does not avoid these risks completely.
If the subscription price is less than fair market value at the time the
subscription agreement is made, the employee has income and the corpo-
ration can claim a deduction equal to the bargain in that year, unless the
stock acquired is subject to a restriction which significantly affects its
value. 2 But the outright purchase has the distinct advantage over the
option route of considerably reducing the risk of dispute with the Service
over fair market value. First, it is so much simpler in concept and execu-
tion, and it is less likely to attract inquiry from the Service as a practical
matter. 3 Secondly, since there is only one decisive date for valuation -
that when the subscription agreement is executed - the Service has only
that one opportunity to dispute the value used by the parties. Thirdly,
the amount of the bargain, if any, usually is smaller at the date the ar-
rangement is made than it is later when the installments are paid (or
the option installments are exercised). Accordingly, the amount of the
employees' exposure to ordinary income is limited to the smallest amount
possible in the circumstances, if as assumed throughout, the values in-
crease over the years. Moreover, in contrast to qualified stock options,
the corporation's right to daim a deduction corresponding to the amount
taxed to the employee as compensation does not depend upon what the
employee does with his stock.
These are substantial advantages. However, heretofore there has
been an unfortunate tendency among practitioners to equate employee
stock purchases with stock options, particularly restricted stock options,
31. OmoR-v. CODE § 1701A4(B).
32. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (2), (5) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6416, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 126.
Of course, if such a restriction exists, the same problems under the Regulations arise whether
the stock is acquired by outright purchase as by exercise of an option.
33. The new option reporting requirements of CODE § 6039 relate only to transfers of
stock pursuant to exercise of a "qualified stock option," a "restricted stock option,' or an
option described in CODE §§ 423(c) and 424(c) (1). Reg. § 1.61-15(c) as amended by
T.D. 6696, approved Dec. 9, 1963 (28 Fed. Reg. 13450, at 13451 1963) requires similar
reports as to non-qualified stock options.
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and to overlook the merits of outright purchase arrangements. In some
cases, an option will be the only arrangement acceptable to the employee.
That this is so in some cases should not blind the practitioner to the
merits of the outright purchase arrangement in other cases where this
alternative is acceptable to the parties.
STOCK RESTRICTIONS
Whether qualified stock options, non-qualified stock options or out-
right purchase is used, it would be extremely helpful if the fair market
value of the shares could be fixed by conditions and restrictions upon the
shares acquired by the employee. Certain writers have cautioned that
such restrictions may not be effective unless there is a bona fide business
purpose for imposing them, as distinguished from tax considerations."
This should pose no problem in close corporations where such restrictions
are so common and well recognized as desirable wholly aside from tax
considerations.
At the same time, it should be recognized that the imposition of cer-
tain kinds of conditions and restrictions may completely destroy the effect
of the stock purchase arrangement and cause it to be regarded as a sham
- as simply a compensation arrangement masquerading as a stock pur-
chase. The conditions and restrictions must not be such as to prevent the
employee from having and exercising the substantial rights of stock own-
ership after exercise of the option or other transfer of the shares.3 5 For
example, if the employee cannot dispose of the stock to anyone except
the corporation, and if the latter is obligated to repurchase on demand on
a basis where the employee or his estate cannot possibly lose, there is risk
that the employee will be treated as not really a shareholder. The lead-
ing cases on this involve outright purchase arrangements."6 But there is
no reason to believe that the same principle does not apply to stock
option arrangements as well."7 In contrast, an arrangement under which
34. See Bergen, supra note 9, at 158; Rudick, Compensation of Executives Under the 1954
Code, 33 TAxEs 7 (1955).
35. Reg. § 1.421-1(f) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6527, 1961-1 CUM. BULL. 153 defines
"transfer" as "the transfer of ownership of such share, or the transfer of substantially all the
rights of ownership." Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (1) (1959), as amended, T.D. 6481, 1960-2 CuM.
BULL. 159 refers to the time the employee has the "unconditional right" to receive the stock.
36. National Clothing Co., 23 T.C. 944 (1955), acq., 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 5 (purchase of
stock for a non-interest bearing note payable only from dividends, restrictions on transfer in
the meantime); Marts, Inc., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 669 (1960), gov't appeal withdrawn,
Third Circuit, 1961 (stock issued below book value, employee never paid or expected to pay,
corporation bound to repurchase on termination of employment at book value or difference
between compensation paid and $85,000, whichever was greater); Walker v. United States,
62-1 U.S.T.C. 5 9347 (W.D. Pa. 1961) (companion case to Marts, Inc.). Contra: Patent
Button Co. v. Commissioner, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 262 (1952), afid, 203 F.2d 479 (2d
Cir. 1953).
37. Rev. Rul. 54-467, 1954-2 CUM. BULL. 207, is the only authority found involving stock
options. It was there held that a transfer of substantially all rights of ownership occurred
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the employee is not assured against loss should be treated in substance as
a stock purchase with potential capital gain consequences.
Conditions and restrictions on shares may leave the employee with
substantial rights of stock ownership,38 but still may have an effect on the
fair market value of the shares. If the Regulations are valid, restrictions
which have a significant effect on the value of the stock postpone deter-
mination of the amount of the employee's compensation (and the corpo-
ration's deduction) to the time such restrictions lapse.3 9  Obviously, this
provision is aimed at restrictions which result in the stock having no as-
certainable fair market value or a lesser value than otherwise. Its justi-
fication is that otherwise temporary restrictions avoid the bargain pur-
chase rule when the shares are transferred to the employee and ordinary
income is completely avoided" unless compensation is realized when the
restrictions lapse and the value of the shares increases. However, the
Regulation goes beyond the necessities of this situation in that it is in
terms not limited to temporary restrictions, is not limited to restrictions
the lapse of which permit the employee to realize a greater amount than
otherwise and, hence, is not limited to the tax avoidance device,41
The examples in the Regulations shed little light on the kind of re-
strictions which the Service regards as having a significant effect on value.
A binding commitment to resell the stock to the corporation at the below-
market price paid for it should employment terminate within two years
even though the stock acquired upon exercise of a restricted stock option could not be trans-
ferred for a period (10 years at a maximum) except (a) with consent, (b) by will or inher-
itance, or (c) sale to an outsider after first refusal to the corporation at its then "current ap-
praised value," and even though the certificates were endorsed and deposited with the corpo-
ration to secure the employee's covenant against transfer.
38. Reg. § 1.421-1(f) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6527, 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 153, probably
means this. If it means what it literally says, i.e., "substantially all the rights of ownership,"
it probably goes too far.
39. Reg. §§ 1.421-6(d) (2) (i), (f) (1959), as amended, T.D. 6481, 1960-2 CrM. BULL.
159.
40. This is the combined effect of Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154 (1952), holding that
stock lacked ascertainable market value where the employee could not sell for a year without
consent and the corporation had a first refusal if his employment terminated in that year or
the employee wished to sell within two years, on the one hand, and Robert H. Lehman, 17
T.C. 65 (1951), gov't appeal dismissed, Second Circuit, June 8, 1952; acq., 1951-1 CiM.
BULL 3, acq. withdrawn and non-acq., 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 7, on the other, holding that
lapse of restrictions is not a taxable event. See excellent discussion in Kempler, Non-Re-
stricted Stock Option Plans - Kuchman and Lehman Cases, 16 TAX L REV. 339 (1961).
41. The Regulation relates to restrictions which have a significant effect on the value of the
stock when it probably is intended to apply only to those which "significantly reduce" the
value. Conceivably the "restriction" might result in a fair market value higher than the
Service would determine for shares not subject to the "restriction." For example, the corpora-
tion might be obligated to repurchase in certain events at a price determined by formula, let
us say, the same formula which was used in good faith by the parties in determining value
and price of the shares when they were originally transferred to him. The Service has no
legitimate interest in applying the Regulation in such cases. For this reason, perhaps the term
"restriction" in the Regulation should be interpreted as limited to those terms and provisions
which are designed to depress the value of the shares temporarily.
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for any reason other than death is regarded as having such an effect.4 2
The restriction lapses, either at the end of the two year period or on the
employee's death within that period and, under the Regulation, compensa-
tion income is realized at that time. On the other hand, a restriction
providing that if the employee desires to dispose of the stock during his
employment, he must offer it to the corporation at fair market value does
not significantly affect its value,43 although the same arrangement using
book value rather than fair market value does have this effect." In
terms, the Regulation is broad enough to cover any arrangement whereby
the employee is prohibited from selling for a period of time," or is obli-
gated during his lifetime or the period of his employment to sell to the
corporation or to the other shareholders at a figure which is below fair
market value.4"
The validity of these Regulations is bound to be tested and there ap-
pears to be a fair chance that the courts will reaffirm the Lehman deci-
sion47 and hold that lapse of restrictions is not a taxable event." The
possibility of overturning the Regulations appears to be particularly good
where the restrictions on transfer relate to close corporation stock and
42. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (2) (b) (ii) (1959), as amended, T.D. 6481, 1960-2 CuM. BULL.
159, Exs. (1) & (2).
43. Id. at Ex. (3).
44. Id. atEx. (4).
45. In addition to Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154 (1952), see, e.g., Heiner v. Gwinner,
114 F.2d 723 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 714 (1940) (no sale for one year); McDonald
v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1956), on remand, 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 208,
second appeal, 248 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1957) (no sale while employed by corporation);
Bassick v. Commissioner, 85 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 592 (1936) (no sale
until January 1st of the following year); Junior Amusement Co., 15 T.C.M. 577 (1946)
(no sale for five years); I.T. 2309, V-2 CUM. BULL. 114 (sell only to corporation for five
years).
46. For federal estate tax purposes (and possibly for federal gift tax purposes also), such
arrangements have been regarded as fixing fair market value. Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F.2d 166
(2d Cir. 1936); Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1932). See also Estate Tax Reg.
5 20.2031-2(h).
47. Robert H. Lehman, 17 T.C. 652 (1951), govt appeal dismissed, Second Circuit, June
8, 1952; acq., 1951-1 CuM. BULL. 3; acq. withdrawn and non-acq., 1952-2 CuM. BULL. 7.
48. There is a possibility that the principle of the Regulations may be completely avoided
by creating a separate class of common stock to be sold to employees, including the "restric-
tion" affecting value in the terms of that stock. If the stock is repurchased at the employee's
death or other termination of his employment, it is difficult to see how there is any "lapse"
of the restrictions where they are inherent in the shares themselves. In addition, if it is in-
tended that the employee's shares be restricted for a definite period of years, the special class
of common shares might provide for conversion into or exchange at the end of that period
for the other class of common shares, not containing any restrictions. Under CODE § 1036(a),
no gain or loss is recognized on the exchange of common for common of the same corporation.
A court might find it difficult to hold that an alleged "lapse" of restrictions attributable to
such an exchange should be regarded as a taxable event in the face of a statute providing that
the exchange of shares shall not be a taxable event. But that result is not entirely impossible.
See, e.g., the decisions discussed in Garver, Liquidations Under Section 337, 13 W. RES. L.
REV. 245, 255-56 (1962), holding that ordinary income is realized upon sales which are in
terms within the nonrecognition provisions of CODE 337 (a).
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are of the usual kind, not tax motivated. For example, a fairly typical
dose corporation arrangement is to permit transfer by gift within the
employee's family, to provide for an option to the company to repurchase
at death or upon termination of his employment, and to restrict sales and
other disposition of his shares in the interim to assure the company's right
to repurchase. If the repurchase price was dearly fair market value, the
Regulation would not apply.49
Because the stock of dose corporations is difficult to value, the re-
purchase price is ordinarily determined by a formula, not uncommonly
100% or a higher or lower percentage of book value. The formula
value is generally regarded by the parties as an approximation of fair
market value. The formula is not used out of any desire temporarily to
depress the value of the shares so that the employee will benefit when
the restrictions "lapse" at his death or on prior termination of his em-
ployment. Indeed, it may be the same formula which was used to deter-
mine the price at which the stock was originally sold to the employee.
The parties regard restrictions which persist until the employee's death or
prior termination of his employment as permanent rather than as tem-
porary restrictions. Not infrequently they closely parallel or are the same
as the restrictions which also exist on the shares of the company outstand-
ing in the hands of nonemployees. The Regulations apply only if the
Service successfully contends that, notwithstanding these facts, the for-
mula yields a figure below fair market value. If the validity of the Regu-
lations is presented to the courts in this context, it is not unlikely that
they will be held invalid.
More importantly, sound administration of the tax laws demands that
the principle of the Regulations should never be applied to such cases.
The Regulations should be modified so as not to impair the legitimate use
of restrictions on transfer of close corporation stock. The use of a for-
mula for determining the price at which shares are required to be repur-
chased or may at the company's option be repurchased from the employee
is a practical necessity in a close corporation. The formula may or may
not result in what the Service may, with hindsight, later agree is fair mar-
ket value where the shares have no market, fair or otherwise. But if
the parties make an honest effort to approximate fair market value by
such a formula, the employee and his estate should not be exposed to the
harsh consequences which flow from the Regulations, viz., unexpected
49. Reg. § 1.421-6(a) (2) (ii) (1959), as amended, T.D. 6481, 1960-2 CUM. BULL. 159,
Ex. (3).
50. At least one writer suggests that the Regulation will not apply if the employee is re-
quired first to offer the stock to the corporation at a price less than its fair market value but
in excess of the price which the employer paid for it, even though the restrictions may be for
a temporary period. Willis, Non-Restricted Stock Options, 101 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1146.
1205 (1962).
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